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human rights mean?
The cultural politics of human rights disrupts taken-for-granted
norms of national political life. Human rights activists imagine
practical deconstruction of the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens through which national states have been constituted. They
envisage a world order of cosmopolitan states in which the rights of
all would be fully respected. How likely is it that such a form of
society might be realised through their activities? Is collective
responsibility for human rights currently being shaped in cultural
politics? If so, how, and with what consequences? If not, how is it
that the vision of human rights activists is failing to take effect given
the explosion of discourse on human rights in recent years?
A focus on what human rights mean to social and political
actors, and on how these meanings impact on their institutional-
isation, has been missing from the study of human rights.
1 And yet it
is only through cultural politics that the ideals of universal human
rights may be realised in practice. What I mean by ‘cultural politics’
is more or less organised struggles over symbols that frame what
issues, events or processes mean to social actors who are emotionally
and intellectually invested in shared understandings of the world.
But cultural politics is not only the contestation of symbols. Cultural
politics concerns public contests over how society is imagined; how
social relations are, could and should be organised. It is only through
1 Fuyuki Kurasawa’s study of what he calls the ‘ethico-political labour’ of human
rights is an impressive theoretical advance in terms of establishing the importance
of struggles over meaning to the practices of human rights (Kurasawa 2007).
Ultimately, however, it is disappointing that Kurasawa does not link this labour to
changes in institutions of governance and states, but conﬁnes his analysis to
movements in civil society.
NASHKA: 9780521853521c01 11/8/08 8:51:44pm page 1practices that are meaningful to people that social life is possible at
all: the social institutions that constrain our lives are nothing but
routinised shared understandings of what is real and what is worth-
while. Although social actors rarely, if ever, imagine a fully formu-
lated blueprint of a new society, even during revolutionary periods, in
using or contesting symbols that are meaningful to them they are
nevertheless engaged, more or less consciously, either in trying to
bring one about, or, just as likely, in defending what already exists.
Human rights are the object of cultural politics concerning
global justice. Globalisation raises difﬁcult questions concerning
how justice must now be rethought beyond the national frame which
successfully routinised shared understandings of justice as relevant
only to fellow citizens. Human rights are themselves globalising as
they are deployed in strategies to end human rights violations or to
condemn states which resist international pressure to comply with
human rights norms. In images of suffering in the global media
which are framed as issues of human rights, and in responses to
violations which seek to extend capacities for global governance,
human rights are themselves an aspect of globalisation. However, at
the same time, human rights also seem to stand above globalisation,
to represent a framework through which globalisation itself might be
regulated and global governance organised. The comprehensive
schedule of human rights developed by the UN and in regional sys-
tems of human rights seem to offer a framework for justice beyond
states, a global constitution to guide the political development of the
planet. This book is concerned with whether and how globalising
human rights may become established as norms of global justice
through cultural politics.
Although it is now common to think of human rights as
essential to just global governance, it is important to note that it is
only through states that human rights can be realised. States do not
just represent dangers and obstacles to the realisation of human
rights, as sometimes appears to be the case in the literature on human
rights violations; they are absolutely necessary for the realisation of
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2 what does it matter what human rights mean?human rights in practice. In this respect, it is particularly important to
consider how human rights are contested and deﬁned within states. It
is only with the collusion of state agents that human rights are vio-
lated, and only states can secure and enforce human rights within
their own territories.
2 Even at the international level, human rights
systems exist only by state agreement; it is states that act together in
international organisations to create conditions for the realisation of
human rights. States raise taxes to pay for international organisations,
authorise personnel to act in them on their behalf, and maintain the
military and police force that can, in principle at least, be used to
enforce human rights.
States, like all other social institutions, are constituted as
routinised social practices which establish that members of society
‘know how to go on’ in any particular situation. Language, symbolic
communication organised into settled patterns of shared under-
standings as discourse, is the most important structuring dimension
of institutions. This is equally the case in formal, bureaucratic
organisations, such as those of the law and government, where face-
to-face interactions are generally regulated by the tasks at hand, and
by written materials that guide what is to be done, as it is in more
loosely networked and informal spaces, such as those of social
movements. At certain times conﬂicts arise about ‘how to go on’ in
social institutions, over whether settled interpretations are fair, or
accurate, or valuable. These conﬂicts often begin as a result of the
activities of social movements, which challenge taken-for-granted
understandings of routinised social life and militate for change
in policy and legal documents which share in and reinforce those
understandings. During periods of cultural political activity, common
2 Although, in recent times powerful states have used a rhetoric of human rights to
justify military intervention into other states, the legality of such measures is
highly contentious, military intervention is never undertaken solely to secure
human rights, but always primarily for reasons of security or economic advantage,
and – as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan – it is also, unsurprisingly,
ineffective (Chandler 2006; cf. Cushman 2005).
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what does it matter what human rights mean? 3interpretations are disrupted and become open to re-interpretation.
Such conﬂicts may, where authoritative decision-makers allow it,
or where they ﬁnd themselves obliged to respond to contentious
re-interpretations, result directly in changes in the law, or in govern-
ment policy.
3
‘How to go on’ in the face of contention over what are clearly
stated in international law as universal human rights but which are
in practice selectively applied and enforced within national states
is currently highly contested. In this book I analyse precisely how
cultural politics are constructing human rights in particular forms.
I do so through a series of in-depth case studies comparing the US and
UK. Both states have been and are currently prominent in extending
human rights internationally; in both, within the national arena, the
cultural politics of human rights practices is complex and hard-
fought. Ofﬁcials in these liberal-democratic states of long-standing
clearly ﬁnd it difﬁcult, imprudent or unnecessary to adopt universal
norms of human rights in practice, despite the fact that leaders of
these states have been responsible for developing and promoting
them in the international arena. In-depth study of the role of cultural
politics is crucial to understanding their reluctance to realise human
rights in practice and what it means for their future possibilities.
human rights culture and cultural politics
With the exception of anthropological studies, which are now mov-
ing beyond the debate over universalism and relativism in interesting
3 I developed this understanding of cultural politics in Contemporary Political
Sociology, where I drew on the work of post-structuralists, especially Laclau and
Mouffe, and of sociologists, especially the work of Giddens on structuration
theory (Nash 2000). This approach also has a good deal in common with that of
American cultural sociologists, though I remain of the view that, speciﬁcally in
order to study social institutions we must understand culture as constitutive
(rather than causal): whilst the cultural and the social may be separated
analytically, symbolic meaning and social institutions are, in reality, so
inter-related as to be indistinguishable. If culture is constitutive, it is not possible
to identify an independent causal direction to its inﬂuence (cf. Alexander and
Smith 2003).
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4 what does it matter what human rights mean?ways, the importance of culture to the study of human rights has
not been so much neglected as it has been routinely referred to as
essential in literature on policy and politics without, however, being
given rigorous attention in its own right.
4 It is above all in references
to ‘human rights culture’ that the importance of linking inter-
subjective and institutional dimensions of human rights is noted.
‘Human rights culture’ marks out a fairly well-established under-
standing that culture is crucial to fostering the realisation of human
rights in practice. However, it is invariably used to provide the
answer to the problem of how human rights might be realised. In this
study, in contrast, the concept of ‘human rights culture’ is the occa-
sion for questions concerning the kind of research that is necessary to
establish how the cultural politics of human rights is actually engaged.
Rather than accepting that human rights culture is the ethical answer
to the question ‘how can human rights ideals be realised in practice?’,
it is important to think about how we might study the cultural politics
of human rights and their effects on social institutions.
There has been no systematic study of human rights culture.
However, the term has been widely used in a diverse set of inter-
ventions in policy debates at the international and national level (UN
2004; Lasso 1997; see also www.breakthrough.tv). It has also been
discussed by theorists of human rights from different disciplinary
backgrounds (Rorty 1993; Klug 2000; Parekh 2000; Mertus 2004,
2005). ‘Human rights culture’ ﬁnds political and theoretical support
because it marks the importance of inter-subjective understandings
of human rights to their realisation, which are otherwise overlooked
in policy debates and in academic studies of human rights. The
common theme of the diverse uses of ‘human rights culture’ is that
in order to be successful human rights must win hearts and minds.
Mertus puts it well (drawing on the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo’s
4 Anthropological work on the meanings of human rights has been an inspiration for
this project, especially for the way in which anthropologists treat human rights as
culture (Cowan et al. 2001; Merry 2006; Wilson 1999).
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human rights culture and cultural politics 5deﬁnition of culture): human rights will only be established once
human rights are one of the ‘forms through which people live their
lives’ (2005: 212). Helena Kennedy, in the foreword to Klug’s Values
for a Godless Age, describes human rights culture as involving, ‘not
just aspirational principles, but a practical code for existence’ which
should not be left to lawyers, ‘a new erudite priesthood, taking the
life out of the debates’ (Kennedy 2000: xiii).
Though ‘human rights culture’ is used in many different ways,
across all its uses there is a kernel of agreement. What is needed to
establish human rights is a shift in public sentiments: every single
person must simply be respected and treated as an individual human
being with entitlements, regardless of their gender, racial, ethnic or
religious background. It should become unthinkable and intolerable
that anyone should ever act against human rights, whether at home
or abroad. Ignoring human rights must become ethically and emo-
tionally repellent if human rights ideals are to become reality. Only
then is there any real possibility of establishing and maintaining
institutions that uphold human rights norms.
The concept of ‘human rights culture’ raises two main prob-
lems for investigation in this study. Firstly, supplying an answer to
the problem of how human rights are to be realised, it tends to sug-
gest an essentialist understanding of culture as a ‘way of life’ (even
where there is the explicit attempt to break with this conception
of culture (see Mertus 2004: 212)). Advocates of human rights cul-
ture must emphasis the stability and coherence of shared values,
understanding and emotional commitments to human rights – even
if this is more a future aspiration than a present reality. It is
the stability and coherence implied by ‘culture’ that is precisely the
value of human rights culture when it provides an answer to the
question, ‘can human rights be realised?’. However, there is general
agreement amongst cultural theorists that culture is not stable,
coherent or enduring in the way that advocates of human rights
culture must assume (Cowan et al. 2001; Ortener 2006).
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6 what does it matter what human rights mean?Secondly, the concept of ‘human rights culture’ does not enable
the investigation of precisely how culture effects change. In par-
ticular, it has not been developed to engage with the question of
precisely how it is that state ofﬁcials, who are ultimately responsible
for institutionalising and enforcing human rights, might be motiv-
ated to put human rights into practice. The answer that ‘human
rights culture’ provides to the question of how human rights are
realised seems to assume either that judges and politicians who make
effective decisions concerning the realisation of human rights act as a
result of cultural norms that are shared by the whole society; or that
they act because of public pressure, itself shaped by shared cultural
norms that are developed in civil society, the realm of sentiment and
ethical values, which may then inﬂuence cold-hearted or anxiety-
driven judgements of state ofﬁcials.
In order to investigate the importance of culture to realising
human rights ideals, I propose to replace the idea of ‘human rights
culture’ with that of the ‘cultural politics of human rights’. It is vital
to preserve the insight of advocates of human rights culture that
culture does make a difference to human rights. My approach is
intended to expand and extend that understanding whilst avoiding
reliance on a discredited essentialist deﬁnition of culture. ‘Politics’
could be used to sum up the principal theoretical difference between
essentialist understandings of culture as a settled way of life and
contemporary understandings of culture as inherently ambiguous,
contested and structured by power. Cultural theorists have shown
how power, and therefore politics, is inherent in all practices of
symbolisation through which meaning is communicated. Cul-
ture structures institutional positions of authority which validate
particular perspectives, creating hierarchies of subordination and
obscuring or excluding recognition of differences and inequalities. It
is not that there is no consensual stability to culture. To a large
extent culture involves the reproduction of traditions, habits, per-
ceptions and understandings. But culture is also inherently ﬂuid and
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human rights culture and cultural politics 7dynamic, a continually moving and ‘changing same’ (Gilroy 1993:
101). Constructed in relations of power, culture is always open to
political challenge and contestation, whilst at the same time, caught
in the inertia of repetition, it is resistant to intentional invention.
From the perspective of contemporary cultural theory, human
rights are not just supported by culture: human rights are cultural.
There is nothing meaningful in social life that is outside culture:
human rights are cultural insofar as they are meaningful. Further-
more, there is also, then, no absolute distinction between practices of
state and civil society: culture is not a distinct arena of society; it
does not just involve the media, for example, or education, or reli-
gion. Culture, as Jeffrey Alexander puts it, ‘is not a thing but a
dimension, not an object to be studied as a dependent variable but a
thread that runs through, one that can be teased out of, every con-
ceivable social form’ (Alexander 2003: 7). In so far as representations
of human rights formed in civil society are inﬂuential on state
practices, this is possible because human rights are meaningful on
both sides of the analytic and socially sustained distinction between
civil society and the state. What links ofﬁcially sanctioned state
practices and public pressure from civil society is cultural politics.
It is, of course, important to maintain an understanding of the
speciﬁcity of different institutional practices, including those that
are legal or governmental: different spheres of social life are created
and sustained by different reﬂexive practices, including ceremonial
rituals, formal and informal codes maintaining the distinctiveness of
institutional settings, bodies of regulation that are speciﬁc to par-
ticular activities and so on. I develop the theoretical importance of
these distinctions for the study of human rights in Chapter 2.
Moreover, it is not that there is no value in distinguishing between
state and civil society. Indeed, I will make use of just such a dis-
tinction in this book. But it is important to understand that human
rights are not simply adminstered through state procedures, as if they
always already existed as clear and distinct aims. As they are enu-
merated in international human rights agreements, the Universal
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8 what does it matter what human rights mean?Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Convention
of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Conven-
tion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and so on,
the meanings of human rights are relatively clear, even if their
abstract formulations in these agreements allows a good deal of
latitude for interpretation. These meanings are not, however, ﬁxed;
human rights are deﬁned and redeﬁned as policies are created and
administered, legal claims dealt with and so on – both inside and
outside state procedures.
f r o mt h en a t i o n a lt ot h e
cosmopolitan state?
Human rights can only be enforced by states. The case studies in this
book focus on cultural politics of human rights within states as the
most important spur to the formal realisation of human rights,
at least in the advanced capitalist liberal-democracies with which
I am concerned. But human rights are not, of course, solely, or even
mainly the business of national states; in fact, it has been much more
common to think of human rights as international. Human rights
were initially developed in the international arena through diplo-
matic negotiations which led to the signing of treaties and conven-
tions between states – most notably the UDHR and subsequent
conventions derived from it (which we will explore more fully in
the following chapter). In recent times, moreover, the networks of
intergovernmental and non-governmental actors engaged in trying to
bring about human rights in practice has become so signiﬁcant within
and across states that it has become common to refer to human rights
as globalising (Brysk 2002; Coicaud 2003; Mahoney 2007).
What does it mean to think of human rights as globalising?
In one sense, of course, human rights are necessarily global insofar
as, universal in form, they involve principles of justice for all human
beings. It is with respect to their potential for institutional effect-
iveness, however, that human rights are increasingly considered to be
globalising: the vast majority of states have committed themselves to
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from the national to the cosmopolitan state 9precise and detailed international human rights agreements; and, as a
result of human rights activism, interpretations of international law
may deepen that commitment and at the same time extend it to
include even those states that have not formally bound themselves to
such agreements. In this respect, we might say that, because human
rights are becoming increasingly institutionalised across the world,
they now have the potential, historically unprecedented, to become
effectively (as opposed to, or as well as, formally) global. For the ﬁrst
time in history human rights may become genuinely effective norms
of global justice.
The potential of human rights to become effective norms of
global justice can only be realised through state transformation.
Although human rights are globalising, the national context is espe-
cially signiﬁcant to the realisation of human rights. In fact it could be
that it is because human rights are increasingly global that they have
become so much more signiﬁcant within states historically consti-
tuted as national. Compared to the international arena, predominantly
a sphere of activity for elites, the national arena is much more popu-
list: issues are addressed to ‘the people’ as democratically entitled
citizens as well as to elites. What is important in the cultural politics
of human rights – as we shall see very clearly in the chapters of
analysis in this book – is how the global and national are entangled in
human rights practices. There is (almost) a global human rights regime
and state elites are under pressure from above and below to bring
policies and practices into conformity with the principles of that
regime. What human rights actually mean in practice, however,
depends to a large extent on the cultural politics of human rights in
the national context.
In order to clarify how the cultural politics of human rights
may be contributing to the realisation of global human rights through
state transformation, it is useful to make a working distinction
between ideal-types of ‘national’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ states. Theorists
of state transformation now generally take the view that states are
not dissolving and nor are they becoming irrelevant in the face of
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10 what does it matter what human rights mean?processes of globalisation. States are rather adapting in order to
manage ﬂows of ideas, goods, services and people across their bor-
ders, becoming increasingly integrated into international networks
that link them together in dense assemblages of shared norms and
procedures connecting processes, insititutions and actors. Saskia
Sassen analyses such processes of state transformation as ‘denationa-
lization’. For example, in speciﬁc cases, she says, the work of ‘national
legislatures and judiciaries’ is now caught up in processes of global-
isation which ‘re-orient particular components of institutions and
speciﬁc practices . . . towards global logics and away from historically
shaped national logics’ (Sassen 2006: 2). Similarly, Anne-Marie
Slaughter argues that states are now disaggregating across borders, as
government regulators, judges and legislators network with their
counterparts from other states and from supranational institutions
like the EU, in order to share information, harmonise regulation and
develop ways of enforcing international law (Slaughter 2004; see also
Held 1995).
Where, like Sassen, theorists focus on political economy, they
are generally critical of state transformation as it is currently being
shaped by the de-regulation and re-regulation of national economies
that leave workers unable to exercise much, if any, control over
multinational corporations and ﬂows of capital (see also Tonkiss
2007: Chapter 3). A focus on human rights, however, gives rather a
different emphasis to the study of contemporary state transform-
ation. The cosmopolitan state is a necessary condition of the
full realisation of human rights as they are enumerated in inter-
national human rights agreements. This is not because human
rights are inherently neo-liberal. On the contrary, as we shall see in
Chapter 5, international human rights agreements actually encode
a political order that much more closely resembles global social
democracy than neo-liberalism. Moreover, how human rights are
realised in practice, the kinds of social forms that are actually
enabled by the cultural politics of human rights, is precisely the
f o c u so ft h i ss t u d y .
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from the national to the cosmopolitan state 11The ideal of the national state as the basis of the global order is
conventionally dated to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, but this is
controversial.
5 As Craig Calhoun, for example, argues, nation-states
hardly existed at this time, even in Europe; and certainly empires
thrived for 300 years after the Treaty (Calhoun 2007: 14; Krasner
1999: 20; Lawson 2008). What we can say with a reasonable degree of
historical accuracy, is that the national state was hegemonic from
the end of the Second World War, which saw the dismantling of
formal European empires, until the end of the Cold War. As a polit-
ical ideal, the national state was immensely signiﬁcant during
this time for anti-imperialist nationalist movements and minority
nations who sought liberation from the majorities with whom they
shared a state. In the case of established national states in North
America and Western Europe, the ideal of the national state func-
tioned more typically as a frame within which political activities
were carried out and claims for justice were made. The national state
also functioned in academic research, and to some extent also pol-
itically, as an ideal-type, a heuristic device against which to assess
actually existing states. The ideal-type of the national state involves
three main features:
1. sovereignty – a state is to be free from interference by other states in
its policy-making and law enforcement to enable justice as self-
determination of the people;
2. for self-determination to be effective, states must have sole jurisdiction
over what takes place within their own national territory, where
jurisdiction concerns the ‘power of the state to affect people, property
and circumstances’ (Shaw 2003: 574);
5 Charles Tilly has suggested distinguishing ‘nation-states’, ‘whose people share a
strong linguistic or symbolic identity’ from ‘national states’, which attempt to
integrate large populations and territories, who do not necessarily share common
cultural norms in the same way (quoted in Calhoun 2007: 56–7). Although
‘nation-state’ is the more common term, as states have generally made nations out
of a diversity of groups sharing different languages and customs rather than being
found by pre-existing nations I prefer ‘national state’.
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12 what does it matter what human rights mean?3. the political community is the people who make up the nation and,
ultimately, they must consent to public policy made in their name – if
not through elections, then by not rising up against the government or
the state.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the national state was
clearly staked out as a political ideal for persecuted and disenfran-
chised nations, as the taken-for-granted frame of political activities,
and as the norm to which actually existing states everywhere should
conform or against which their approximations might be assessed
and criticised.
In comparison, since the end of the Cold War changes in state
structures are evident along all three dimensions of this ideal-type as
states become embedded in extended networks of global governance.
The possibility that human rights may become effective norms of
global justice depends on the direction and extent of these changes.
Can the cosmopolitan state now displace the national state to
become the ideal, the frame and the norm for political life in the
twenty-ﬁrst century? Drawing on research on changes that are judged
to be currently taking place in state formation, and also on the work
of political theorists on the progressive potential of those changes,
the ideal-type of the cosmopolitan state may be characterised by the
following features:
1. state sovereignty is transformed in international institutions of co-
operative global governance and this is necessary to meet the policy
problems increasingly thrown up by globalisation (Held 1995; Slaughter
2004; Beck 2006; Sassen 2006);
2. the legitimacy of policy actors depends upon the extent to which they
conform to norms of international human rights and humanitarian law
developed through international state co-operation (Soysal 1994;
Jacobson 1996; Crawford and Marks 1998; Beetham 2000; Held 2002);
3. the legitimacy of public policy depends on the appropriateness of the
scale at which it is made – from global to local – which in turn depends
on the scale of the relevant policy problem and accountability to
different political communities according to an ‘all affected’ rule (Held
1995; Gould 2004; Fraser 2005).
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from the national to the cosmopolitan state 13If globalising human rights are to realise their potential to become
effective norms of global justice, the cosmopolitan state that puts
international human rights agreements into practice must become,
like national state before it, the ideal of the persecuted, the taken-for-
granted frame of ‘normal’ political life, and the benchmark against
which actually existing states are assessed. At the same time, how-
ever, the creation of human rights obligations in law and policy is
absolutely necessary to the transformation of national into cosmo-
politan states. The realisation of human rights and the formation of
cosmopolitan states are mutually dependent, two sides of the same
fundamental changes that are necessary to achieve a framework for
global justice through human rights.
As we shall see in the following chapters, the cosmopolitan
state is an ideal for human rights activists, even if they do not
explicitly articulate it as a political goal in the way that nationalist
movements invariably aimed (and in some cases still aim) to secure a
national state. What part does this ideal play in the cultural political
of human rights? Is a clash of ideals perhaps avoided as the cosmo-
politan state is built incrementally and relatively unnoticed as an
effect of particular legal judgements and government policies within
the national state? Or is it rather that the national state remains
dominant as the taken-for-granted frame within which ‘normal’
political life takes place, relatively unaffected by norms of human
rights to which no more than diplomatic lip-service is paid in
international arenas? If so, what effect does this dominance of the
national state have on human rights in practice?
The very real possibility that human rights may now play a
role in state transformation arises because of their hybrid status as
intermestic; they are both international and domestic at the same
time (see Rosenau 2003; Steinhardt 1999). In conventional legal
scholarship, human rights are conceived of as a matter for either
international or national law. However, the reality of human rights
practices is now much more complex. The intermestic status of
human rights is nowhere more in evidence than the way in which
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14 what does it matter what human rights mean?international law, especially customary international law, is used in
national courts – as we shall see in Chapter 3. In national courts,
decisions that draw on customary international law conﬁrm and
extend its status as law whilst binding the national state to its
observance in the particular case in question. Human rights are not
just international: they are not solely the concern of international
governmental organisations like the UN or the Council of Europe;
nor are they only of value in international courts, like the European
Court of Human Rights. Human rights are not transnational either;
they are not simply ideas that cross national borders. Human rights
are intermestic: legal claims to human rights which draw on inter-
national law in national courts disrupt and sometimes re-conﬁgure
jurisdictional borders between the international and the domestic
from within states.
What is at stake in the cultural politics of intermestic human
rights is how conﬂicts over justice might be re-framed in cosmopol-
itan rather than national terms. In ‘Reframing Justice’ Nancy Fraser
has analysed how arguments about justice, which until recently con-
cerned only relations among fellow citizens within national states
around the established topics of political representation, distribution
and, more recently, recognition, are now exploding into debates over
the very framework within which justice as such must be considered
(Fraser 2005; see also Fraser 2007, 2008).
6 Conﬂicts over justice, Fraser
suggests, always involve ﬁrst-order questions about the substance of
inequalities: representation, redistribution or recognition. But they
also now involve second-order, meta-level conﬂicts over the frames of
justice:
6 Fraser’s use of ‘frames’ involves two dimensions. Firstly, frames are schemas of
interpretation that appear obvious, but which allow social actors to attribute
relevance to events and persons in ways that are appropriate to their situations. A
frame allows people to ‘locate, percieve, identify, and label a seemingly inﬁnite
number of concrete occurences deﬁned in its terms’ (Goffman 1986: 21). Secondly,
frames literally exclude some events, persons and processes, whilst including
others as signiﬁcant (see also Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).
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recognition of cultural differences or political representation?
ii) ‘who’ counts as a subject of justice – now that it is no longer obvious
that it is only citizens who count, whose interests and needs deserve
consideration?
iii) ‘how’ should conﬂicts over justice be decided – by what procedures,
using which criteria, at what sites and by whom?
Struggles over deﬁnitions of intermestic human rights are amongst
conﬂicts over justice that explode the previously taken-for-granted
frame of justice as concerning citizens within the national state. In
doing so, they potentially open up meta-questions along all three
dimensions that Fraser has identiﬁed as relevant to issues of global
justice. Are we living in a period in which deﬁnitions of human
rights are being progressively expanded? If not, how is it that human
rights, which appear to derive their legitimacy from international
consensus on their content and form, are altered, and narrowed, as
they become matters of concrete conﬂict within particular states?
What are human rights?
In conﬂicts over intermestic human rights the very content of claims
for global justice is at stake. International human rights agreements
are comprehensive, taking in all the concerns Fraser identiﬁes as
crucial to conﬂicts over justice: they potentially establish a frame-
work for the re-distribution of global wealth; for the recognition of
cultural difference within and across states; and for the securing
of political rights to democratic participation. In this study we
will particularly focus on conﬂicts over human rights concerning
fundamental civil rights to individual freedom. These are very well-
established as core human rights in international agreements to
which European and North America states subscribe, which leaders
of the US and UK were involved in creating, and which they continue
to advocate. If these human rights are not validated and secured as a
result of the cultural politics of intermestic human rights, it is
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rights will be possible in the US and UK. Nevertheless, in order to
explore a range of questions concerning the ‘what’ of human rights in
the intermestic human rights ﬁeld in these states, in Chapter 5 we
will also look at concrete possibilities of deﬁning global justice in
terms of social and economic rights. Social and economic rights are
also quite well established in international human rights law though
they are more disputed than civil and political rights at the inter-
national level.
Who is the subject of human rights?
International human rights agreements are very clear, as we shall see:
the subject of human rights agreements is any individual human
being in the world; distinctions between citizens and non-citizens
with respect to fundamental human rights are not permitted in
international law. However, in states historically founded on the
distinction between citizens and non-citizens, interpretations of
human rights commitments which apparently abolish that distinc-
tion in particular cases are highly contested. Again, how are inter-
national norms altered in intermestic cultural politics, by whom, and
with what authority?
How are conﬂicts over human rights to be decided?
Conﬂicts over ‘how’ deﬁnitions of what human are to be decided are
also highly contested in the cultural politics of human rights. In
Chapter 2 we will consider how these conﬂicts are structured in the
intermestic human rights ﬁeld. They invariably result as challenges
to activists’ claims that human rights are already clearly established
as law in international agreements.
It is through the cultural politics of intermestic human rights
that the tensions inherent in the transformation from national to
cosmopolitan state may – in principle – be worked out. The ideals of
the national and cosmopolitan state are not necessarily contradictory.
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in Europe, Immanuel Kant suggested that national states could be
transformed into cosmopolitan states, of a kind. Kant proposed that, as
a result of the exercise of public reason, states should bind themselves
to peaceful co-operation with other states through international law,
and cultivate the exercise of hospitality towards individual strangers
(Kant 1991). Kant’s model of the relations between republics with a
‘cosmopolitan intent’ is of discrete, sovereign states. Aside from this
difference, however, his formulation is not so far from the optimistic
solution for ameliorating the tension between the national and the
cosmopolitan state that has been proposed much more recently by
David Held: ‘The principles of individual democratic states and soci-
eties could come to coincide with those of cosmopolitan democratic
law . . . and democratic citizenship could take on, in principle, a truly
universal status’ (Held 1995: 232–3).
In her comparative work on post-national citizenship in
Europe, Yasemin Soysal has effectively argued that long-term resi-
dents of European states who are not citizens and who have won
social entitlements by appealing to international human rights
agreements have altered national states in a cosmopolitan direction
(Soysal 1994; see also Benhabib 2004; Sassen 2007). David Jacobson
has made a similar analysis of post-national citizenship in the US in
relation to illegal immigrants (Jacobson 1996). Soysal and Jacobson
argue that long-term residents in Europe and the US who are not
citizens have achieved post-national citizenship status for them-
selves and their families, thus blurring the sharp legal distinction
between citizens and non-citizens within states along some dimen-
sions – notably access to education, healthcare and employment. The
status of refugees and asylum-seekers who have rights in the soci-
eties in which they are resident only as a result of the international
human rights agreements is another example of a shift towards post-
national citizenship, though they generally have access to minimal
entitlements (the right to remain incarcerated, for example, rather
than being deported, in the case of many asylum-seekers) compared
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that the absolute distinction between citizens and non-citizens is
being called into question in practice as a result of uses of human
rights within states. However, as Soysal herself argues, as it is states
historically constituted on an absolute distinction between national
citizens and non-citizens which administer international human
rights agreements, progress towards a more ﬂexible citizenship is
complex and highly uncertain (Soysal 1992: 156–62; Soysal 2001).
There have been changes in the practices of human rights since
Hannah Arendt famously argued that human rights are actually
enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous states, and that, as
the end of the First World War indicated, the world ﬁnds ‘nothing
sacred in the in the abstract nakedness of being human’ (Arendt 1968:
299). However, these changes are partial, paradoxical and in principle,
and sometimes in practice, reversible (Castles and Davidson 2001).
Progress in human rights can not be assumed – especially given the
fact that the cosmopolitan project, including that of the realisation of
human rights, has for so long been associated with the progress of
history itself in Western thought.
What human rights actually mean in practice matters because
it can not be assumed that increased activity around human rights,
including their expansion in international law, necessarily results in
a progressive movement from national to cosmopolitan states. In this
study I focus on case studies in which, unlike those studied by Soysal
and Jacobson, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is in
sharp relief in the cultural politics of intermestic human rights.
These cases are not matters of routine administration concerning
long-term residents within states. They are rather high-proﬁle legal
and/or media cases concerning a range of different ‘non-citizens’.
Such cases, I suggest, enable us to study precisely how the realisation
of human rights, which would undoubtedly result in transformation
from a national to a cosmpolitan state if it were a simple matter of
‘applying’ international law, are being contested in ways which make
that outcome rather less than certain in reality.
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Because this book makes detailed, in-depth analysis of the cultural
politics of intermestic human rights in the national context it is
only possible to focus on a limited range of case studies. Never-
theless, appropriate comparison across at least two national contexts
is necessary if it is to be possible to generalise the ﬁndings in any
signiﬁcant way. The US and UK make for a good comparison of the
cultural politics of intermestic human rights because they share a
number of similarities in terms of intermestic human rights cases.
Cross-national comparison is facilitated by the fact that the US and
UK are relatively similar along a number of dimensions that are
important to human rights. Because of these similarities, the differ-
ences between two states are all the more striking.
Domestically, the US and UK have quite similar legal and
political systems; they developed historically from the same roots
and have continued to inﬂuence each other. They share, for example,
a legal system based on common law – in contrast to continental
Europe, even if the UK has, famously, no written constitution.
Internationally, both the US and UK have been global leaders in
human rights, and their politicians continue to present themselves as
such. The US and UK took the lead in setting up the UN human
rights system after the Second World War, and the US remains by far
the largest contributor to the UN, even if it sometimes takes this role
reluctantly. More recently – and notoriously – the leaders of both
countries, key actors in the UN Security Council and allies in
NATO, have used the vocabulary of human rights to justify military
intervention, claiming to be acting in the name of the rule of law and
of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. There has also been, and there
continues to be, a good deal of exchange between the two countries,
both in terms of the diplomatic and military ‘special relationship’
that is fostered by state elites, and also in terms of popular culture.
In terms of existing conditions for the cultural politics of
human rights, however, the US and UK are rather different. In the
ﬁrst place, the US is the sole remaining global superpower (for the
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in all the most powerful international networks, but it is far richer
and stronger in military and economic terms than any other state
with which it shares these networks. This gives it a very particular
role. In contrast, the UK, whilst similarly embedded in networks of
global governance, is obviously far smaller and less powerful than the
US as a state. Moreover, there is another very signiﬁcant difference of
scale between the US and UK with respect to human rights: the UK
is networked into the only really effective international human
rights system in the world, that of the Council of Europe and the
European Union. The regional US equivalent, the Inter-American
system of human rights, is practically without inﬂuence in US affairs
(Moravcsik 1994: 54–5).
The US has long been a world leader in human rights.
7 At the
same time, however, the US has also gained the reputation of being
an ‘outlier’ in human rights. This reputation has undoubtedly been
exacerbated by the ‘global war on terror’, but it has a much longer
history. The US is an outlier in human rights because of the way in
which US state ofﬁcials resist binding domestic and foreign policy
through international human rights agreements, which it neverthe-
less promotes for others, rather than because it is among the
world’s worst violators of human rights.
8 As contributors to Michael
7 In fact, world leadership in terms of human rights dates back to the American
Declaration of Independence, which framed the American state as a ‘carrier’ of
liberal democratic norms for humanity before the French Revolution and the
Declaration of the Rights of Man to which the origin of human rights is more
usually traced (Calhoun 2007: 131; cf. Woodiwiss 2005 for an alternative account).
8 This is not to say, of course, that the US has not been involved in human rights
violations: as W. E. B du Bois argued in 1947, racial discrimination in the US may
very well be understood as involving violations of human rights (Mazower 2004:
395); it is well-known that the US has been indirectly implicated in human rights
violations, by supporting regimes that US elites know to be involved in torture and
genocide (such as Pinochet in Chile in 1970s and Suharto in Indonesia in the
1980s); and there is also evidence to suggest that the US has been directly involved
in such activities, especially through the CIA in Latin America (Chomsky et al.
1999). Nevertheless, the US is still by no means the world’s worst state for human
rights violations.
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show, there is a deep-rooted suspicion of international conventions of
human rights in US political culture, accompanied by the belief that
the US has a special destiny with respect to the discovery and
legitimacy of fundamental rights elaborated by its own courts and
institutions (Ignatieff 2005; Kahn 2005; Steiker 2005). US excep-
tionalism with regard to human rights is more than simply a matter
of unilateralism, however, because the US is both a leader and an
outlier in human rights. The International Convention of Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) is perhaps the most famous example of
US resistance to the human rights standards it recommends for
others. The US was closely implicated in drawing up the ICCPR,
which largely reﬂects an American understanding of civil and polit-
ical rights. However, when the US ﬁnally ratiﬁed the ICCPR in
1992, almost twenty years after it came into force, it did so only with
a reservation that allowed capital punishment, even for juveniles,
though ‘right to life’ is the key provision of the Convention, and
Article 6 (5) prohibits the imposition of the death penalty ‘for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age’ (Roth 2000).
The UK also has a mixed reputation in relation to international
human rights, which has not been improved by the ‘global war on
terror’ in which it has played the part of the US’s closest ally.
Nevertheless, as a member of the Council of Europe, the UK is
unambigously situated within the European system of human rights.
This system – set up by the Council of Europe after the Second World
War – was part of the revolutionary changes in the legal relationship
between states and individuals of that period, allowing petitions by
individuals against states, as well as by states against other states
(Dembour 2006). It enjoys a high level of prestige and its rulings
receive a good deal of publicity within member states. In 1998, the
European Convention of Human Rights was ﬁnally incorporated into
UK national law as the Human Rights Act (HRA). The cultural
politics of human rights have been especially lively leading up to
and since the HRA in the UK, with wide-ranging debate amongst
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understood and enacted legally, morally and politically. It need only
be noted here that the same government that has cultivated the
‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US in the global war on
terror was also the government that passed the Human Rights Act.
US exceptionalism with regard to human rights is well-
established. This exceptionalism is, however, strongly contested
in the cultural politics of intermestic human rights ‘from below’,
within the US. Indeed, I take it that because of its status and power in
the international arena it is only ‘from below’ that resistance to
human rights on the part of US elites could possibly be shifted at all.
In the UK, the liveliness of the cultural politics of human rights in
the last few years could result in fundamental state transformation.
The UK could become more ‘European’, tending towards realising
and extending global human rights norms in practice. It could, on
the other hand, become more more ‘American’, tending towards
extending global human rights norms only as long as they have no
real effect on domestic or foreign policy. As the following chapters
indicate, the fact of being in Europe may not be enough to ensure that
it is the ‘European’ path that is taken.
outline of the book
In Chapter 2, I develop a methodology for the study of cultural pol-
itics of intermestic human rights using the concept of ‘human rights
ﬁeld’. Cultural politics does not concern free-ﬂoating symbolic
representations: it takes place in, is affected by and in turn affects the
institutions that are constraining of social life. Social institutions are
invariably hierarchical, but cultural politics does not necessarily only
concern the furtherance of personal power and self-interest. Justiﬁ-
cations in the professional settings with which we are concerned
here also concern ideals which can, on occasion, be effective because
they are persuasive to others within those settings, because they
are made by actors with the authority to make effective decisions,
or because they are accepted by others who are similarly oriented
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cultural politics of intermestic human in a variety of settings that are
crucial to deﬁning and institutionalising human rights.
In the following chapter, then, I map out in some detail the four
domains of the human rights ﬁeld: juridical, governmental, activist
and the mediated public. Law is especially important to human
rights. In fact, the study of law and legalisation remains dominant in
research on human rights, which is still largely undertaken by legal
scholars. In the legal approach, human rights are seen as synonymous
with human rights law. Such an understanding is obviously to be
avoided, and ﬁnding out precisely how human rights are constructed
as meaningful across different inter-related institutional settings is
precisely the aim of this study. Nevertheless, it is important to note
that the most vigorous cultural politics of human rights are very
often centred on courts. This is reﬂected in the case studies chosen
for this book, which take seriously legal claims to human rights and
the counter-claims of governmental ofﬁcials and their lawyers,
which are also, though not exclusively, couched in legal terms, as a
principal means through which human rights are being contested. It
is because, as a matter of empirical fact, courts are one of the prin-
cipal sites through which human rights are being extended that we
must study how human rights are contested in law. The other prin-
cipal site for the contestation of human rights is the media, though
this, in contrast, is rarely studied by those researching human rights.
In the media, meanings of human rights are often contested in terms
other than those of human rights law or ofﬁcial governmental rhet-
oric. Translated from their legal meanings into popular political
ideals, in the mediated public understandings of human rights are far
more likely to privilege citizenship than they are to deconstruct it,
and this has important implications for the success of human rights
claims-making elsewhere.
This map of the human rights ﬁeld enables exploration of how
sites of contestation, which have previously been coded as national,
may be transformed by human rights. How human rights are
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inﬂuenced by professional justiﬁcations formed in relation to those
settings. Where ofﬁcials in the judiciary and government exercise
state authority, these justiﬁcations put limits on what human rights
effectively mean in practice, what they can and can not do. Studying
cultural political engagements in the intermestic human rights ﬁeld
enables an understanding of how international human rights norms
are brought into the national context, what is at stake for different
actors in the ﬁeld, and how human rights become meaningful in very
particular ways, which are often rather different from those for which
they were developed in institutions of global governance.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 each take parallel case studies in order to
compare the cultural politics of intermestic human rights in the US
and UK. These case studies of intermestic human rights in the
national setting involve the interpenetration of national and inter-
national along at least one of the following dimensions: human
rights claims are made on behalf of non-citizens who may or may not
be resident in the state in which they are made; they are made by
organisations supported by transnational advocacy networks; they
are addressed to national state elites (in courts or in the government),
but they draw on international (as well as domestic) law. Each of the
case studies in these chapters concerns the cultural politics of
intermestic human rights in relation to state transformation in order
to assess the real likelihood of a shift from national to cosmopolitan.
Chapter 3 is an analysis of how state sovereignty is affected by
the cultural politics of intermestic human rights. Is state sovereignty
being transformed in human rights practices? If so, how? In par-
ticular, the chapter examines sovereign decisions to suspend normal
law in the name of national security. Both the US and UK have
adopted security measures in the ‘war against terror’ that violate
human rights by arbitrarily detaining terrorist suspects who are non-
citizens. International human rights law requires that the distinction
between citizens and non-citizens should be abolished with respect
to fundamental human rights. National states, on the other hand, are
NASHKA: 9780521853521c01 11/8/08 8:51:46pm page 25
outline of the book 25supposed to exist for their citizens, not for humanity. Whilst national
states exist to protect citizens’ rights, cosmopolitan states are sup-
posed also to provide equal protection for the rights of every indi-
vidual human being.
Analysing the cultural politics of intermestic human rights in
the US and UK around these sovereign decisions, what is most
interesting is that in both states challenges to the violations of uni-
versal human rights resulting from ‘exceptional’ security measures
were made predominantly in terms of national pride. In the US it
might be supposed that this was because there is very little scope for
legal challenges to human rights violations in international law
within the US state, and to some extent this is the case. However, in
the UK, both in courts and in the mediated public, technical legal
understandings of European human rights law became entangled
with sentiments of national pride, expressed by supporters of uni-
versal human rights as well as their opponents. Unexpectedly, in
these cases universal human rights were deﬁned by their defenders as
linked to a properly functioning national state, not in terms of
cosmopolitan ideals.
In Chapter 4, having identiﬁed the importance of national pride
to the contestation of human rights in Chapter 3, we continue to
explore the complex entanglements of cosmpolitan ideals, national-
ism and human rights. Here, in contrast to the cases studied in the
previous chapter, we examine the cultural politics of cases that are
celebrated by the human rights movement as advancing the realisa-
tion of human rights as effective norms of global justice. The analysis
particularly concerns how human rights activists and innovators
in the judiciary try to effectively imagine a political community
beyond the nation in order to realise human rights in practice. In
doing so they are attempting to create a cosmopolitan state even if
they do not explicitly name it as an ideal, focussing rather on the
practical cases in question. In the US activists use the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA), which enables cases to be brought against
foreign agents for human rights violations committed against
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immensely signiﬁcant in the US context; drawing on customary
international law in national courts, they are effectively the only way
to introduce intermestic human rights into US political life. In
comparison I investigate the cultural politics of the Pinochet case in
the UK, in which lawyers similarly drew on customary international
law in national courts, and which has been seen by many as a turning
point in the progress of cosmopolitan law.
Around ATCA and Pinochet activists and human rights sup-
porters were engaged in imagining community beyond the nation,
trying to mobilise sympathy in the US and UK for the civil rights of
human beings in countries far away, and to gain support for action to
realise human rights in practice. Using ground-breaking legal cases
they attempted to create excitement and sympathy for human rights,
to foster a global political community from within the state which
would recognise obligations to realise international human rights
encoded in international human rights law. We investigate the terms
of this imagined global community, how and where it was justiﬁed,
and how it was in competition with the visions of more conservative,
or simply more cautious, actors in the human rights ﬁeld. These
actors responded in two main ways to the challenge: they either
defended the national community along conventional lines, albeit
with an emphasis on its place in the international community of
states; or they re-imagined the national community in a new, and
potentially rather dangerous form, that of cosmopolitan nationalism.
What appears to be developing around the contestation of globalising
human rights, then, in response to the model of global citizenship
proposed by human rights activists and supporters, are varieties of
nationalism which are either against or, at the very least, indifferent
to the deconstruction of the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens in practice, or which are for its deconstruction but in a
politically strategic way that is at odds with the spirit of the uni-
versalism of human rights as such. The very deﬁnition of inter-
national law itself, how it is to be interpreted and practiced in the
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from national to cosmopolitan, depends on how conﬂicts between
these visions of political community are resolved.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we consider an attempt to construct
solidarity through cultural politics. If it is difﬁcult to imagine a
community of global citizens, how much more difﬁcult is it to
imagine global citizens experiencing solidarity? Solidarity is a vital
aspect of national citizenship: national states have enjoyed unrivalled
success in organising solidarity as an expectation that material risks
and resources should be shared amongst citizens. It is also a vital
aspect of any possibility of global citizenship to be realised through
cosmopolitan states. As an absolute minimum, global citizenship
requires a restructuring of Northern states to allow fairer policies of
trade and the re-distribution of wealth between North and South. In
this chapter we will explore the prospects of constructing cosmo-
politan solidarity beyond the nation in popular campaigns against
global poverty: Make Poverty History in the UK and ONE in the US.
These campaigns involved activists in powerful states using the
media to put pressure on state ofﬁcials to change international pol-
icies that create poverty in other states. However, although there is
detailed international human rights law covering the global distri-
bution of economic resources, one of the notable features of these
human rights cases, as opposed to those that took place in courts, is
that they failed to get recognition as concerning human rights at all
within the national settings of the US and UK. While the ultimate
failure of these campaigns in terms of ending or even ameliorating
global poverty is not attributable to the fact that they were not
couched in terms of universal human rights, it is notable that they
both failed to engage the structures of global governance in terms of
human rights, and they also failed to transform those structures in a
way that would alter the conditions of wealth distribution between
North and South. Although very successful in mobilising popular
support, these campaigns against global poverty have had no effect at
all on state transformation.
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national justice that has linked states and national political com-
munities. This is problematic when it leads to decreasing popular
control over the state procedures through which justice is deﬁned
and put into practice. If calling the frame of national justice into
question is to be productive rather than simply destructive of
democratic gains over the long history of struggles for justice in the
name of the nation, questions concerning what justice involves and
how it is to be achieved must be extended to include the interests and
values of human beings who are not fellow citizens, and who may
not even be resident within the same state. There is no doubt that
this is a very tall order. Human rights activists are trying to bring
it about by piecemeal reform of the state through creative uses
of human rights in different campaigns, and especially by bringing
test cases in national courts. The success of this project depends on
the reform of existing structures of states that have been formed as
national, and on the authoritative decision-making of ofﬁcials
empowered to make deﬁnitions of human rights that have practical
force. It depends on cultural politics.
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